Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons
War Crimes Memoranda

War Crimes

2001

Expert Witnesses
Kimberly M. Miles

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/war_crimes_memos
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Miles, Kimberly M., "Expert Witnesses" (2001). War Crimes Memoranda. 231.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/war_crimes_memos/231

This Memo is brought to you for free and open access by the War Crimes at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in War Crimes Memoranda by an authorized
administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
WAR CRIMES PROSECUTION PROJECT
(In conjunction with the New England School of Law)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR

ISSUE: EXPERT WITNESSES

Prepared by Kimberly M. Miles
Fall 2001

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX TO SUPPLEMENTAL DOCUMENTS………………………………………iii
I.

Introduction and Summary of Conclusions…………………………………….…1
A. Issues……………………………………………………………...…………..1
B. Summary of Conclusions……………………………………………………...1
1. The Tribunal’s Rules of Evidence Do Not Address the Role of Expert
Witnesses at the ICTR………………………………………….1
2. Guidance for a Standard of Admissibility………………………..…....2

II.

Definition of an Expert……………………………………………………………2

III.

Legal Discussion
A. Adversarial v. Inquisitorial Systems ……………………………………….
1. Adversarial Countries………………………………………………….
a. Expert Witnesses in the United States……………………….
b. Expert Witnesses in Great Britain……………………………
c. Expert Witnesses in Canada…………………………………….
2. Inquisitorial Countries………………………………………………
a. Expert Witnesses in France………………………………….…
b. Expert Witnesses in the Netherlands…………………………
3. Countries with aspects of both…………………………………………..
4. The Collaborative Nature of the ICTY/ICTR.........................................
B. How to Qualify an Expert in the United States……………………………….
1. For Use as a Consulting Expert…………………………………….
2. For Use as a Testifying Witness (impartial or otherwise)………………
C. Admissibility of Expert Testimony at the ICTR……………………………..
D. How to Challenge an Expert………………………………………………..
1. In the United States…………………………………………………..
2. At the ICTR………………………………………………………
E. Scope of Expert Testimony………………………………………………
1. In the United States……………………………………………..
2. At the ICTR…………………………………………………………
F. Rules of Discovery Governing Expert Testimony…………………………….
1. In the United States……………………………………………………
2. At the ICTR……………………………………………………………..
G. Previous Uses of Expert Witnesses……………………………………………..
1. In Criminal Trials in the United States………………………………….
a. Forensic Sciences…………………………………………….
b. Forensic Medicine………………………………………………
c. Psychiatry/Psychology………………………………………
2. At the ICTR……………………………………………………………
a. Cultural/ Political/ Historical………………………………..
b. Linguistic……………………………………………………..
c. Forensic…………………………………………………………

i

INDEX TO SUPPLEMENTAL DOCUMENTS
STATUTES & RULES
1.
FED.R.CIV.P. 26(b)(4)(B).
2.

FED.R.EVID. 104(a ).

3.

FED.R.EVID. 702-706 (U.S.).

4.

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Rules of Procedure and Evidence
http://www.ictr.org (visited October 3, 2001).

5.

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Amendments to The
Rules of Procedure and Evidence. http://www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/IT183e.htm
(visited October 3, 2001).

6.

No. 1884.20 November 1996. NO. 86 of 1996: Criminal Procedure Amendment
Act, 1996. http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/legislation/1996/act96-086.html.
(visited 10/17/01).

CASES
7.
Ager v. Jane C. Strormont Hosp., 622 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1980).
8.

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

9.

Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

10.

General Electric v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).

11.

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

12.

The Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu (Case No. ICTR-96-4-T), Decision on a
Defence Motion for the Appearance of an Accused as an Expert Witness.

13.

The Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema (Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T) Decision on the
Request of the Defence Pursuant to Rule 73 of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence for Summons on Witnesses.

14.

The Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora (Case No. ICTR-96-7-T) Decision of the
Defence Motion for pre-Determination of Rules of Evidence.

15.

The Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema (Case No. ICTR-96-13-T) Decision on the
Prosecutor’s Request for Leave to Call Six New Witnesses.

ii

16.

The Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana (Case No. ICTR-99-52-I) Decision on the
Prosecutor’s Oral Motion for Leave to Amend the List of Selected Witnesses.

17.

The Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana (Case No. ICTR-99-52-I) Decision on the
Prosecutor’s Application to Add Witness X to its List of Witnesses and for
Protective Measures.

18.

R. v. Mohan, ([1994] 2 S.C.R. 9).

19.

The Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda (Case No. ICTR96-3-T) Decision on the Defence Motion for Disclosure of Evidence.

20.

Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440 (2000).

BOOKS
21.
STANLEY L. BRODSKY, THE EXPERT EXPERT WITNESS (1999).
22.

ROBERT CLIFFORD, QUALIFYING AND ATTACKING EXPERT WITNESSES (2001).

23.

MICHAEL HIRST, ANDREWS & HIRST ON CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (1997).

24.

M. MALSCH AND J.F. NIJBOER, COMPLEX CASES: PERSPECTIVES ON THE
NETHERLANDS CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999).

25.

JACK V. MATSON, EFFECTIVE EXPERT WITNESSING (1999).

26.

VIRGINIA MORRIS AND MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA (1998).

27.

CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER AND LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE
RULES, Fourth Edition (2000).

LAW REVIEWS
28.
Marc N. Garber, Opening Daubert’s Gate: Testing the Reliability of an Expert’s
Experiences After Kumho, 15 CRIM. JUST. 4 (2000).
29.

Paul Giannelli and Edward Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence: The Fallout from
Supreme Court’s Decision in Kumho Tires, 14 CRIM. JUST. 12 (2000).

30.

Hyongsoon Kim, Adversarialism Defended: Daubert and the Judge’s Role in
Evaluating Expert Evidence, 34 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 223 (2001).

iii

31.

Bill Madden, Evidence: Changes to the Role of Expert Witnesses, (2000) 38 (5)
LSJ 50. http://www.lawsocnsw.asn.au/resources/lsj/archive/jun2000/50_4.html
(visited 10/3/01).

32.

Leslie Morsek, Get on Board for the Ride of Your Life! The Ups, the Downs, the
Twists, and the Turns of the Applicability of the “Gatekeeper” Function to
Scientific and Non-Scientific Expert Evidence: Kumho’s Expansion of Daubert,
34 AKRON L. REV. 689 (2001).

33.

Sean D. Murphy, Developments in International Criminal Law: Progress and
Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
93 Am.J.Int’l.L 57, 80 (1999).

34.

Richard C. Reuben, Completing the Admissibility Equation: Justices May Fill the
Gap in Daubert Test of Scientific Evidence, 83 A.B.A.J. 44 (1997).

35.

William C. Smith, No Escape from Science: As science and technology become
integral to more types of cases, expert testimony is increasingly important to the
outcomes. Judges and lawyers still struggle with how to apply standards for
admitting expert testimony, 86 A.B.A.J. 60 (2000).

DICTIONARIES
37.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999).
ARTICLES
38.
Admissibility of Expert Testimony: What’s Next? By Ira H. Leesfield and Mark
A. Sylvester http://www.expertpages.com/news/admissibility_testimony.htm
(visited 9/21/01).
39.

Christopher J. Bruce, The Role of Expert Evidence, ECONOMICA LTD., SUMMER
1999 VOL. 4, NO. 2, http://www.economica.ca/ew42p2.htm (visited 9/4/01).

40.

Sean P. Downing, The Use of Expert Witnesses in Civil and Common Law
Jurisdictions http://www.nesl.edu/center/center/wcmemos/memoindx.htm (visited
10/17/01).

41.

ExpertLaw.com- Criminal Litigation Expert Witness Directory
http://www.expertlaw.com/experts/criminal.html (visited 10/12/01).

42.

Forensic Psychiatry in South Africa http://bama.ua.edu/~jhooper/southaf.html
(visited 10/17/01).

43.

Foundation Hirondelle, Agency of Information, documentation and formation,
Arusha (Tanzania): International Penal court for Rwanda, Anderson George
Rutaganda, Witnesses of Defence.
http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=fr&u=http://www.hirondelle.org/h

iv

irondelle.nsf/c0d4ea7a44b64faec12564e500421ff1/0693445a8faae88ec12568300
006d6fc%3FOpenDocument&prev=/search%3Fq%3DRutaganda%26hl%3Den
(visited 11/28/01).
44.

General Information About Expert Witnesses and Consultants
http://expertpages.com/news/new1.htm (visited September 21, 2001).

45.

James R.P. Ogloff, The Supreme Court Clarifies the Standard for Expert Witness
Testimony, PSYNOPSIS SPRING 1996. http://www.cpa.ca/Psynopsis/expert.htm
(visited 10/15/01).

46.

New Guidelines for Expert Witnesses http://www.sparke.com.au/ (visited
10/3/01).

47.

Opinion Evidence http://www.forensicmed.co.uk/opinion_evidence.htm (visited
10/17/01).

MISC.
48.
American Board of Forensic Anthropology http://www.csuchico.edu/anth/ABFA/
(visited on 10/27/01).
49.

Vocabulary section of:
http://school.discovery.com/lessonplans/programs/forensics/

v

I.

Introduction and Summary of Conclusions

A. Issues

This memorandum addresses the role of expert witnesses at the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (the Tribunal)1. Aspects considered include both how to
qualify your witness as an expert and how to challenge the opposition’s expert. This
memorandum addresses the allowable scope of expert testimony and gives examples of
ways that experts have been used in the past in the United States, various other countries,
and before the Tribunal.
While this memorandum focuses primarily on law of the United States and the
Tribunal, it additionally addresses the implications of differences between the adversarial
and inquisitorial systems on the practice of using expert witnesses before the Tribunal.

B. Summary of Conclusions

1. The Tribunal’s Rules of Evidence do not Address the Role of
Expert Witnesses at the ICTR

The use of expert witnesses in proceedings before the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda is an evidentiary issue governed by the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence. These rules were first developed for the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia.2 The rules were developed by judges of the Tribunal and are considered to

1

Via e-mail, I was advised to discuss the law of expert witnesses in the Unites States, at
the ICTY and ICTR, as well as in other countries such as Canada and South Africa.

1

be neither predominantly common law nor civil law, but rather an integration of both
systems of law. The Rules act as guidelines which outline general procedures, but
individual judges have the responsibility of formulating more detailed evidentiary rules.3
On this issue, the Rules are nebulous at best, as the only time “expert witnesses” are
specifically mentioned is in Section 3: Rules of Evidence, Rule 90(D), which states: “A
witness, other than an expert, who has not yet testified shall not be present when the
testimony of another witness is given…” The Rules, therefore, recognize the existence of
expert witnesses, yet give us no specific guidelines for when to admit their testimony, the
allowable scope of expert testimony, or whether experts should be hired by adversarial
parties or appointed by the court.

2. Guidance for a Standard of Admissibility

The task for the Tribunal is to balance the proffered evidence using Rules 89(C)
and 95. 4 Rule 89(C) states that “a Chamber may admit any relevant evidence which it
deems to have probative value.” Rule 95 provides that “no evidence shall be admissible if
obtained by methods which cast a substantial doubt on its reliability or if its admission is
2

Article 14 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda states: The judges of
the International Tribunal for Rwanda shall adopt, for the purpose of proceedings before
the International Tribunal for Rwanda, the rules of procedure and evidence for the
conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, trials and appeals, the admission of
evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses and other appropriate matters of the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia with such changes as they deem
necessary. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 4.]

3

VIRGINIA MORRIS AND MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR RWANDA (1998). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 26.]
4

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, entered
into force June 29, 1995. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 4.]
2

antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of the proceedings.” This is not
unlike the Daubert standard used in the United States, which weighs the probative value
of scientific evidence against the reliability of the methods used.5 In Kumho,6 the
Supreme Court of the United States recently expanded this test from including only
scientific expert evidence to all proffered expert testimony. Therefore, any party wishing
to proffer expert evidence must show that the expert is qualified, that the facts used in
forming the opinion were reliable, that the methods used in formulating the opinion were
likewise reliable, and that the testimony would be helpful to the trier of fact.

II.

Definition of an Expert
BARRON’S LAW DICTIONARY defines an expert witness as a witness having special

knowledge that would assist the tribunal.7 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY defines experts in
three separate categories: consulting, testifying, and impartial.

5

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Discussed in
detail infra. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8.]
6

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). Discussed in detail infra.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11.]
7

An expert witness is “a witness having ‘special knowledge of the subject about which
he is to testify;’ that knowledge must generally be such as is not normally possessed by
the average person. The expert witness is thus ‘able to afford the tribunal having the
matter under consideration a special assistance.’ This experience may derive from either
study and education, or from experience and observation. An expert witness must be
qualified by the court to testify as such. To qualify, he or she need not have formal
training, but the court must be satisfied that the testimony presented is of a kind which in
fact requires special knowledge, skill or experience. Such testimony, given by an expert
witness, constitutes expert evidence or expert testimony.” BARRON’S LAW DICTIONARY
(4th ed. 1996).
3

A consulting expert is “an expert who, though retained by a party, is not expected
to be called as a witness at trial.”8 Consulting experts are utilized by attorneys in trial
preparation- to aid in the understanding of a subject matter or to help discern the merits of
a case. Occasionally, experts in psychology assist attorneys during voir dire (the pre-trial
process of jury selection).
An impartial expert is “an expert who is appointed by the court to present an
unbiased opinion.”9
Finally, a testifying expert is “an expert who is identified by a party as a potential
witness at trial.”10 Specifically, an expert witness is defined as “a witness qualified by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to provide a scientific, technical, or
other specialized opinion about the evidence or a fact issue. Also termed a skilled
witness.”11 Experts are those who have education or experience beyond that of the
general public, so that her testimony may provide assistance to the jury.12
Expert evidence or testimony is defined in BLACK’S as “evidence about a
scientific, technical, or professional issue given by a person qualified to testify because of
familiarity with the subject or special training in the field.”

8
9

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 37.]
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 37.]

10

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 37.]

11

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 37.]

12

General Information about Expert Witnesses and Consultants.
http://expertpages.com/news/new1.htm (visited September 21, 2001). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 44.]
4

III.

Legal Discussion

A.

Adversarial v. Inquisitorial Systems

The line between adversarial and inquisitorial systems may not be as clear as it
seems. For example, the United States is a common law country, whose law is based
upon the adversarial system. Yet, even in the United States, courts have the power to
appoint neutral (e.g. unbiased) experts of their own choosing. Fed.R.Evid. 70613 allows
for this appointment on the court’s motion (sua sponte) or on the motion of any party.
The trial judge may appoint any expert mutually agreed upon by the parties or one of her
own choosing.14

1. Adversarial Countries

a. Expert Witnesses in the United States

Historically, the rationale for the adversarial system has been that the individual
parties will strive to bring to light the evidence necessary to resolve their dispute, as they
have the greatest stake in its just result.15 Despite the judge’s role as “gatekeeper” in the

13

FedR.Evid. 706. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3.]

14

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 8.] See also United States v. Shonubi, 895 F.Supp.
460, 468 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).

5

admission of evidence, it is still the responsibility of the American lawyer to gather and
present proof.16 “‘Gatekeeping’ denotes a sieve, not a search.”17
The disadvantage to expert testimony in an adversarial system is that witnesses
may appear to be biased. “Trials…can become expert witness battlegrounds in which
each side presents experts with contradictory opinions.”18 Experts look like “hired guns”
instead of impartial scientists. At trial, opposing counsel will ask a testifying expert who
she is being paid by in order to discount her credibility before the jury.

b. Expert Witnesses in Great Britain

The general rule in Great Britain is that the scope of expert testimony is limited to
facts actually perceived by them. Opinion testimony is considered irrelevant, as the
jurors can formulate their own conclusions based upon the evidence provided.19 Even
when a witness is an unquestioned expert, his opinions will only be admissible if a
determination is made that the opinion is needed (e.g. the court cannot interpret the

15

Hyongsoon Kim, Adversarialism Defended: Daubert and the Judge’s Role in
Evaluating Expert Evidence, 34 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 223 (2001). [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 30.]
16

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 30.]

17

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 30.]

18

JACK V. MATSON, EFFECTIVE EXPERT WITNESSING (1999). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 25.]
19

MICHAEL HIRST, ANDREWS & HIRST ON CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (1997). [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 23.]

6

evidence without help).20 Where the court is asked to determine issues far removed from
its experience, expert opinion on those issues is admissible.21
Like many adversarial countries, Great Britain recognizes that “amateurs” may
have gained special knowledge despite lacking the credentials of a scientific expert. An
expert must be only “suitably qualified;” however, establishing expertise will be difficult
without any formal qualifications.22
Disclosure of all expert witnesses and their testimony is required.

c. Expert Witnesses in Canada

In order for testimony to be considered expert, “the subject matter of the inquiry
must be such that ordinary people are unlikely to form a correct judgment about it, if
unassisted by persons with special knowledge.”23 The expert evidence must be both
necessary, relevant, and reliable.24

20

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 23.]

21

Opinion Evidence http://www.forensicmed.co.uk/opinion_evidence.htm (visited
10/17/01) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 47.], citing Folkes v.
Chadd (1782) 3 Doug KB 175.
22
Opinion Evidence http://www.forensicmed.co.uk/opinion_evidence.htm (visited
10/17/01) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 47.], citing R. v. Silverlock
(1894) 2 QB 766.
23

R. v. Mohan, ([1994] 2 S.C.R. 9). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
18.]

24

Christopher J. Bruce, The Role of Expert Evidence, ECONOMICA LTD., SUMMER 1999
VOL. 4, NO. 2, http://www.economica.ca/ew42p2.htm (visited 9/4/01). [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 39.]
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Opinion testimony is allowed, but the Mohan criteria are on occasion applied
strictly to exclude expert evidence regarding the ultimate issue.25

2. Inquisitorial Countries

The inquisitorial system involves a more active judge, who plays the role of factfinder as well as decision-maker. The judge may appoint experts and question witnesses
directly, in open court. In the inquisitorial system, it is the responsibility of the judge to
seek out the truth.
A possible drawback to incorporating aspects of this system is that the judge may
lose his visage of impartiality. This could have the negative effect of unduly influencing
the jurors for the case.26

a. Expert Witnesses in France

In France, panels of professional judges try criminal cases. These judges
determine the probative value of all evidence. A “Judge Delegate” is responsible for

25

James R.P. Ogloff, The Supreme Court Clarifies the Standard for Expert Witness
Testimony, PSYNOPSIS SPRING 1996. http://www.cpa.ca/Psynopsis/expert.htm (visited
10/15/01). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 45.]
26

Hyongsoon Kim, Adversarialism Defended: Daubert and the Judge’s Role in
Evaluating Expert Evidence, 34 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 223 (2001). [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 30.]

8

gathering all relevant evidence and may request expert assistance on technical matters.27
The Judge chooses the testifying experts. Each court maintains a list of experts, but
judges are free to appoint experts apart from it (including lay persons and corporations).
Parties may move to have an expert removed or to have the expert’s report invalidated
(for conflict of interest, bias, or prejudice), but these determinations are left to the
discretion of the court. As fact-finder, the judge is not required to adopt the findings of
the expert and may attach as much or as little probative value as they wish.28
There are three types of expert assistance in the French system: 1) constationsverification of fact or an answer to a single technical question, 2) consultations- fact
analysis that do not require full explanations (these opinions are generally given orally),
and 3) expertise- an expert is given a judge-defined goal and files a full report with the
court upon completion.29
In the French judicial system, only the judge may question the expert. Litigants
may request a cross-examination, but the questions are formulated by the judge alone.
While this restriction aides a speedy trial, helpful information may never be revealed. In
an adversarial system, parties may discover and challenge both the facts upon which an
opinion is based and the methods used in forming the opinion. Opponents are more
likely to test an expert’s opinion, qualifications, possible bias, and methods on crossexamination than is a judge.
27

Sean P. Downing, The Use of Expert Witnesses in Civil and Common Law
Jurisdictions http://www.nesl.edu/center/center/wcmemos/memoindx.htm (visited
10/17/01). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 40.]
28

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 40.]

29

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 40.]

9

b. Expert Witnesses in the Netherlands

Similar to the United States, Dutch law does not require that experts have an
academic background, but rather “special knowledge.”30 Determinations of admissibility
are lessened enormously, however, due to the fact that in some situations, the laws dictate
the appointment of experts as well as the methods those experts shall employ.31
The Dutch legal system is unlike the United States in that it is a derivative of the
French (Inquisitorial) legal system. The differences in this arena are shocking. In pretrial investigations (held to determine the merits of a case for trial), both parties have the
right to request that the (court appointed) expert be cross-examined, but neither party has
the right to cross-examine the expert themselves.32 Only once trial has begun, do the
parties have the right to summon experts themselves.
Once a party has requested that an expert be summoned on their behalf, they must
next fulfill the “necessity requirement.” This criterion gives the court some latitude in
refusing requests. Again, the judge is acting as “gatekeeper,” but in an altogether
different manner than in countries utilize the adversarial system. As a rule, the defendant
has the right to a counter-expert so long as they meet the requirements of (1) timeliness;
(2) an explicit statement; and (3) adequate explanation (e.g. motive).33

30

M. MALSCH AND J.F. NIJBOER, COMPLEX CASES: PERSPECTIVES ON THE NETHERLANDS
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
24.]
31

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 24.]

32

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 24.]

33

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 24.]
10

As with the United States and ICTR’s governing rules, Dutch defendants are
afforded the right to examine expert testimony before it is presented at trial.34
On appeal to the Court of Cassation, if it is unclear how an expert contributed to
evidence and the expert’s testimony was relied upon by the court, or if expert evidence is
misrepresented, the verdict may be quashed.35
In both Dutch law and the law of the United States, an expert must provide an
explanation as to how she arrived at her conclusion. This is called the “explication rule.”

3. Countries with aspects of both

South Africa is a combination of Roman Dutch law, common law, judicial
precedent, and legislation.36 Controlling legislation is the Criminal Procedure Act of
1977 (as amended 1996).37 Opinion testimony from an expert is acceptable, even in an
affidavit, so long as the affidavit includes information regarding the declarant’s expertise
and the grounds upon which the opinion is based. 38

34

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 24.] See also Article 30-34
Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP).

35

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 24.]

36

Forensic Psychiatry in South Africa http://bama.ua.edu/~jhooper/southaf.html (visited
10/17/01). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 42.]

37

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 42.]

38

No. 1884.20 November 1996. NO. 86 of 1996: Criminal Procedure Amendment Act,
1996. http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/legislation/1996/act96-086.html. (visited
10/17/01). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 6.]
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Australia, like many other countries, recognizes that expertise may be gleaned
from training, study, or experience. What sets Australia apart as a combination of the
adversarial and inquisitorial systems, is the fact that experts are hired by opposing parties
in litigation, but they have “an overriding duty to assist the Court impartially.”39 The
expert should not assume the role of advocate for the party who retains its services.40

4. The Collaborative nature of the ICTY and ICTR

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) is a sui generis
institution, meaning that it has its own rules of procedure that were not adopted from any
single national system. The Rules used were those used at the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY),a similarly sui generis institution.41 The
rules were developed by judges of the Tribunal and are considered to be neither
predominantly common law nor civil law, but rather an integration of both systems of
law.
While the Rules of Procedure and prior cases prove that the laws governing the
admission of expert testimony at the ICTR are very similar to the Daubert standard used
39

Bill Madden, Evidence: Changes to the Role of Expert Witnesses, (2000) 38 (5) LSJ 50.
http://www.lawsocnsw.asn.au/resources/lsj/archive/jun2000/50_4.html (visited 10/3/01).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 31.]
40

New Guidelines for Expert Witnesses http://www.sparke.com.au/ (visited 10/3/01).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 46.]

41

Sean D. Murphy, Developments in International Criminal Law: Progress and
Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 93
Am.J.Int’l.L 57, 80 (1999) (quoting Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Jan. 21, 1998). [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 33.]
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in the United States, the role of the judge is less clear. Rule 54 reads: “At the request of
either party or proprio motu, a Judge or Trial Chamber may issue such orders,
summonses, subpoenas, warrants, and transfer orders as may be necessary for the
purposes of an investigation or for the preparation or conduct of the trial.”42 Likewise,
Rule 98 allows the Chamber to order either party to produce additional evidence.43 The
Judge may therefore determine that the testimony of an expert is probative, order a party
to produce the expert evidence, and issue any necessary summons to call the expert to
testify. Less clear is whether the Judge may then take it upon herself to question the
expert, in the role of inquisitor, once she has summoned them to trial.
A Judge has held that pre-determination of the Rules of Evidence is an
inappropriate task for the Judges, as it is an articulated function of the Plenary of the
Tribunal.44 While this may be true, much confusion would be avoided were the Plenary
of the Tribunal to clearly articulate the role of the Judge regarding expert testimony.

B. How to Qualify an Expert in the United States

The utilization of testifying expert witnesses aids the court by making difficult
evidence more easily understood or by proffering educated opinions which the average
42

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, entered
into force June 29, 1995. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 4.]
43

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 4.] See also, The Prosecutor v.
Ignace Bagilishema (Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T) Decision on the Request of the Defence
Pursuant to Rule 73 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for Summons of Witnesses
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13.]

44

The Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora (Case No. ICTR-96-7-T) Decision of the
Defence Motion for pre-Determination of Rules of Evidence. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 14.]
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layman could not create on his own. The rationale for allowing experts to testify (as
opposed to only allowing affidavit testimony) is based upon the logical foundation that
jurors are then given the opportunity to weigh the mannerisms and sincerity of the expert.
However, because the very nature of expert testimony necessitates that it be beyond the
common knowledge of the average layman, the judge must act as gatekeeper to ensure
that the methods used in formulating the opinion are reliable.

1. For use as a consulting expert

Consulting experts are retained by attorneys solely for information gathering, to
help the attorney understand a case or to evaluate a case and determine the merits of it.
In this role, the expert is merely educating the attorney and there are no guidelines set
forth dictating who an attorney may or may not consult. Consulting experts work closely
with attorneys throughout all stages of trial preparation and litigation.

2. For use as a testifying witness (impartial or otherwise)

Prior to Daubert, a majority of U.S. courts required that admissible expert
testimony be based on generally recognized principles or discoveries. This “general
acceptance” test evolved from the D.C. Circuit’s 1923 opinion in Frye v. United States.45

45

In Frye, the court refused to admit the results from an early form of polygraph testing.
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). It was in this case that the Supreme
Court found that for novel scientific evidence to be admissible, the party offering it must
establish that the techniques used were generally accepted as reliable in the scientific
community. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9.]
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Determination of “general acceptance” required a two-prong test: (1) What is the field in
which the underlying principle falls, and (2) Is the proffered evidence generally accepted
by a substantial majority in this field?46
In 1975, approximately fifty years after Frye’s adoption, the Federal Rules of
Evidence were enacted by Congress.47 Fed.R.Evid. 104(a)48 provides the foundation of a
judge’s role in evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony. It is essential that the
court determine preliminary questions concerning the qualifications of prospective
witnesses and the admissibility of evidence. While Federal Rules of Evidence 702-706
outline the court’s role in determining whether any expert testimony is admissible,
Fed.R.Evid. 702 specifically addresses the issue of admitting scientific expert
testimony.49
Neither the drafting history of these rules nor the rules themselves mention a
“general acceptance” requirement. This absence suggests a clear departure from the Frye
standard for admitting expert testimony. Nevertheless, the “general acceptance” test

46

Leslie Morsek, Get on Board for the Ride of Your Life! The Ups, the Downs, the
Twists, and the Turns of the Applicability of the “Gatekeeper” Function to Scientific and
Non-Scientific Expert Evidence: Kumho’s Expansion of Daubert, 34 AKRON L. REV. 689
(2001). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32.]
47

Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evidence Under the Rules, Fourth
Edition, (2000). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 27.]

48

Fed.R.Evid. 104(a ). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2.]

49

In May 2000, the Supreme Court approved the revised text of Rule 702, requiring that
expert testimony be based upon “sufficient facts or data,” and “reliable principles and
methods.” Substantially, the expert must apply “the principles and methods reliably to
the facts of the case.” For example, infallible evidence that a single small bullet wound
located in the left ventricle of the heart has no reliable application in a stabbing case.
Fed.R.Evid. 702-706. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3.]
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dominated federal and state court analyses of expert witness testimony until 1993, when
the United States Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.50
In Daubert, the Supreme Court made it clear that the Federal Rules of Evidence
superseded Frye. It stated unambiguously that “[although] Frye made ‘general
acceptance’ the exclusive test for admitting expert scientific testimony . . . [t]hat austere
standard, absent from, and incompatible with, the Federal Rules of Evidence, should not
be applied in federal trials.” The Daubert court clearly explained that “no common law
of evidence remains.”51 Therefore, the Federal Rules of Evidence govern whether expert
testimony is or is not admissible. Under the Rules, a trial judge’s primary goal is to act as
“gatekeeper,” admitting only expert testimony or evidence that is both reliable and
relevant.52
The Court in Daubert formulated a reliability requirement, necessitating that
“[t]he subject of an expert’s testimony must be ‘scientific . . . knowledge.” In addition to
derivation by the scientific method, other indicia of reliability include whether a theory or

50

Daubert involved allegations that Bendectin, a prescription antinausea drug marketed
by Merrell Dow, caused birth defects when ingested by pregnant women. Each side
proffered scientific evidence to bolster its respective position on Bendectin’s ability to
cause human birth defects. In an initial ruling on the admissibility of this evidence, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s application of Frye as the
appropriate standard for assessing the admissibility of expert testimony. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari specifically to resolve the issue of whether
Frye’s “general acceptance” test remained the prevailing standard for admitting expert
testimony in light of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 8.]
51

Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 588 (citing U.S. v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 51 (1984)). [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8.]

52

Fed.R.Evid. 702-706 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3.]
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method had been: (1) tested; (2) peer reviewed and published; (3) generally accepted in
the scientific community; (4) deemed to have an acceptable rate of error53; and (5)
subjected to standards controlling technique operation.
The Supreme Court also found that Fed.R.Evid. 702 embodied a relevancy
threshold, in that the evidence or testimony must “assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” When examining this second prong of the
admissibility test, trial courts must consider whether proffered expert testimony is
sufficiently tied to the facts of a case such that the evidence will help a jury to resolve
factual disputes. It is important to note that the expert testimony need not be utterly
essential to the jury’s understanding of a case; it need only be of some assistance .
Expert testimony should be excluded only if it would add nothing to the jury’s decisionmaking process.54
Ever since Daubert, the fact-finder is given the responsibility of deciding whether
or not the expert is reliable (e.g. sincere), but not whether their methods are likewise
reliable. The expert must first convince the judge, in the role of gate-keeper, of her
qualifications and methods. The ruling was designed to liberalize the admissibility of
scientific expert testimony by allowing the court to decide case by case whether each
expert’s methods are reliable. As science progresses rapidly, it would be difficult for the
law to keep pace were the standards of admissibility anything other than lenient.
53

The standard for an acceptable rate of error is “more probable than not” (51%). This is
a very relaxed standard when compared with the scientific community. JACK V. MATSON,
EFFECTIVE EXPERT WITNESSING (1999). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 25.]
54

ROBERT CLIFFORD, QUALIFYING AND ATTACKING EXPERT WITNESSES (2001).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 22.]
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In 1999 the Supreme Court decided Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael55, expanding
the admissibility requirements of Daubert (and the gatekeeping role of the judge) to
include all experts (scientific or otherwise) providing testimony at trial. An expert
witness is now defined as “a witness qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education to provide a scientific, technical, or other specialized opinion about the
evidence or a fact issue. Also termed a skilled witness.”56 “…Daubert’s list of specific
factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts in every case.”57 The
Daubert criteria are meant as helpful guidelines only, and are not definitive.
When a witness is seeking qualification as an expert based upon experience, the
court should consider three factors: (1) the number of experiences from which the
expert’s opinion is drawn, (2) the similarity of those experiences, and (3) the resemblance
between those experiences and the facts of the case.58

55

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). At issue in this case was the
testimony of an expert regarding tire-failure analysis (the case involved a blowout caused
by a defect in the tire’s manufacture or design, the result of which was one death and
several injuries). The expert’s opinions were based on his skill and experience, not
scientific principles. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11.]
56

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 37.]

57

The Daubert court cautioned: “Many factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do not
presume to set out a definitive checklist or test.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 8.] See also Paul Giannelli and Edward Imwinkelried, Scientific
Evidence: The Fallout from Supreme Court’s Decision in Kumho Tires, 14 CRIM. JUST.
12 (2000). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 29.]
58

Marc N. Garber, Opening Daubert’s Gate: Testing the Reliability of an Expert’s
Experiences After Kumho, 15 CRIM. JUST. 4 (2000). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 28.]
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Often, a court will have a Daubert hearing to determine an expert’s qualifications
before the evidence is admitted or heard in front of a jury.59

C. Admissibility of Expert Testimony at the ICTR

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) is a sui generis
institution, meaning that it has its own rules of procedure that were not adopted from any
single national system. The Rules used were those used at the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), a similarly sui generis institution.60
The Tribunal must balance the proffered testimony using Rules 89(C) and 95.61
Rule 89(C) states that “a Chamber may admit any relevant evidence which it deems to
have probative value.” Rule 95 provides that, “no evidence shall be admissible if
obtained by methods which cast a substantial doubt on its reliability or if its admission is
antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of the proceedings.” This is not

59

It is of note that trial courts are not required to hold a “Daubert hearing” every time
expert testimony is challenged, though they often do. See Paul Giannelli and Edward
Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence: The Fallout from Supreme Court’s Decision in Kumho
Tires, 14 CRIM. JUST. 12 (2000). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
29.]
60

Sean D. Murphy, Developments in International Criminal Law: Progress and
Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 93
Am.J.Int’l.L 57, 80 (1999) (quoting Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Jan. 21, 1998). [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 33.]
61

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, entered
into force June 29, 1995. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 4.]
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unlike the Daubert standard used in the United States, which weighs the probative value
of scientific evidence against the reliability of the methods used.62
In 1998, the Tribunal decided a “defence motion for the appearance of an
accused as an expert witness.”63 The Defense proffered this testimony to rebut the
Prosecution’s expert (a historian who specialized in the history of Rwanda). In the
written opinion of the Tribunal, the judge made a distinction between the proffered
testimony [by an expert who has also been charged with the commission of similar
crimes] and testimony “intended to enlighten the Judges on specific issues of a technical
nature, requiring special knowledge in a specific field.”64 The Tribunal also articulated
the requisite conditions that an expert be “a recognized expert in his field” and impartial
in the case.65
With the assent of seven judges, Rule 666 provides that the Rules of Procedure
may be amended.67 A Rule geared specifically toward expert testimony and the specific
standards by which it may be admitted would be advantageous to the Tribunal and the
Office of the Prosecutor.

62

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Discussed in
detail earlier. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8.]

63

The Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu (Case No. ICTR-96-4-T) Decision on a Defence
Motion for the Appearance of an Accused as an Expert Witness. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 12.]
64

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 12.]

65

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 12.]

66

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, entered
into force June 29, 1995. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 4.]
67

VIRGINIA MORRIS AND MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR RWANDA (1998). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 26.]
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D.

How to Challenge an Expert

1. In the United States

Under Frye, judges gave little thought to the admissibility of scientific evidence.
“Judges weren’t second-guessing experts,” a noted commentator explained. “You had to
convince them that it was really flat-Earth science” in order to get a ruling against
admission.68 “In the wake of Daubert, ‘An educated guess or a significant hunch by a
good scientist is not enough. You need good science.”69 Simply cataloging the expert’s
experiences, education and training will not pass muster under Kumho.70
Parties may file pretrial motions to exclude or strike the testimony of an expert.
(These motions are generally based on the four Daubert factors.71) Motions to exclude
evidence should be short and specific. It is wise to focus on the expert’s testimony at
deposition, especially admissions involving factors an expert failed to consider.72 In so

68

William C. Smith, No Escape from Science: As science and technology become
integral to more types of cases, expert testimony is increasingly important to the
outcomes. Judges and lawyers still struggle with how to apply standards for admitting
expert testimony, 86 A.B.A.J. 60 (2000), (quoting William Shelley of Philadelphia’s
Cozen & O’Connor.) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 35.]

69

Id. (quoting Michael Hoenig of Herzfeld & Rubin, NYC). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 35.]

70

Marc N. Garber, Opening Daubert’s Gate: Testing the Reliability of an Expert’s
Experiences After Kumho, 15 CRIM. JUST. 4 (2000). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 28.]
71

Example: “We the Prosecution, file this motion to show that the defense’s expert fails
to meet the judicial standards of relevancy and scientific reliability.” JACK V. MATSON,
EFFECTIVE EXPERT WITNESSING (1999). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 25.]
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doing, even if the motion itself fails, critical weaknesses in the evidence have been
exposed. The judge may rule on the motions (in limine) or she may call for a hearing to
determine the qualifications of the expert.73 A judge may even appoint her own experts
to make recommendations to her!74
Expert testimony, to be held admissible in court, must be deemed both reliable
and relevant.75 To determine relevancy, one must decide whether or not the information
would aid the finder of fact in its determination. If it is found that the subject of the
expert’s testimony is one of such common knowledge that persons of ordinary
intelligence (“the reasonable man”) could reach a decision as easily as the expert, the
expert’s testimony must be excluded as irrelevant.76
Testimony must also be reliable. Judges are naturally suspicious of conclusions
which cannot be independently verified by additional testing. Insufficient testing (in
quantity or method) will undermine an expert’s credibility before either judge or jury.
Amidst enumerated Daubert factors, it is easy to forget about other recognized
evidentiary guidelines. As with all evidence, the probative value must outweigh the
72

William C. Smith, No Escape from Science: As science and technology become
integral to more types of cases, expert testimony is increasingly important to the
outcomes. Judges and lawyers still struggle with how to apply standards for admitting
expert testimony, 86 A.B.A.J. 60 (2000). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 35.]

73

Either side may request a hearing. STANLEY L. BRODSKY, THE EXPERT EXPERT
WITNESS (1999). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]
74

JACK V. MATSON, EFFECTIVE EXPERT WITNESSING (1999). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 25.]
75

Fed.R.Evid. 702-706 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3.]

76

ROBERT CLIFFORD, QUALIFYING AND ATTACKING EXPERT WITNESSES (2001).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 22.]
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prejudicial value of the testimony. Confusing, misleading, or unfairly prejudicial
testimony is excluded.77
If a party disagrees with evidentiary rulings on the trial level, they are afforded
the right to an appeal. Prior to the court’s decision in General Electric Co. v. Joiner,78
the Circuits were split on which standard of review to use on appeal. The sixth and
seventh Circuits used a “manifestly erroneous” standard, while the eighth Circuit required
a “clear abuse of discretion.”79 In Joiner, the justices ruled that trial court decisions on
the admissibility of scientific evidence or testimony may be overturned on appeal for
“abuse of discretion.”80 Appellate court review is not limited to the expert’s
methodologies only. The court may review the expert’s conclusions under this same
standard.81

77

STANLEY L. BRODSKY, THE EXPERT EXPERT WITNESS (1999). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]
78

General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]

79

Richard C. Reuben, Completing the Admissibility Equation: Justices May Fill the Gap
in Daubert Test of Scientific Evidence, 83 A.B.A.J. 44 (1997). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 34.]
80

General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab .] and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]
81

Leslie Morsek, Get on Board for the Ride of Your Life! The Ups, the Downs, the
Twists, and the Turns of the Applicability of the “Gatekeeper” Function to Scientific and
Non-Scientific Expert Evidence: Kumho’s Expansion of Daubert, 34 AKRON L. REV. 689
(2001). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32.]

23

2. At the ICTR

Expert testimony is “intended to enlighten the Judges on specific issues of a
technical nature, requiring special knowledge in a specific field.”82 The Tribunal also
articulates the requisite conditions that an expert be “a recognized expert in his field” and
impartial in the case.83 Any one of these requirements may be challenged in a Motion
before the Tribunal. A party may question (1) whether the issue is technical in nature;
(2) whether the issue requires “special knowledge” in a specific field (contrasted with
common knowledge);84 (3) whether the expert is “recognized in his field;”85 or (4)
whether the expert is impartial.
In The Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema,86 the prosecution was denied leave to
amend his list of witnesses to add an expert, due to the fact that, after examination of the
content of the expert’s statement, the judge believed he did not “need” to hear the expert
witness or to admit into evidence the expert’s statement. The Tribunal determined that it

82

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32.]

83

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32.]

84

This is analogous to the relevance requirement of the Daubert standard used in the
United States.

85

Similar to the “general acceptance” test once used as the standard for admitting
scientific expert testimony and currently used as a factor for the admission of any
proffered expert testimony. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993). (Discussed in detail supra). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
8.]
86

The Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema (Case No. ICTR-96-13-T) Decision on the
Prosecutor’s Request for Leave to Call Six New Witnesses. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 15.]
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was the burden of the prosecution to demonstrate need and to relate the expert evidence
to the crimes charged in the indictment.87 Therefore, in circumstances where the expert is
being offered outside the time limitations set out in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
the expert may be challenged for a lack of “need.”

E.

Scope of Expert Testimony

1. In the United States

BARRON’S LAW DICTIONARY (under “expert witness”) states, “Hypothetical
questions [asking the witness to assume stated facts] may be asked of an expert witness
as a way of educating the trier of fact in the area of the expert’s knowledge or
experience.” This constitutes opinion testimony, which is only permissible from a
qualified expert.88 Moreover, the opinion of an expert may go to the ultimate issue to be
decided.89

2. At the ICTR

The Tribunal allows testimony that may assist the judges in understanding
evidence involving a technical or specialized field. There is no Rule of Procedure
87

The Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema (Case No. ICTR-96-13-T) Decision on the
Prosecutor’s Request for Leave to Call Six New Witnesses. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 15.]
88

Fed.R.Evid. 702-706 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3.]

89

Fed.R.Evid. 704 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3.]
25

specifically governing the allowable scope of this testimony, nor is there prior case law
which dictates whether experts may proffer opinion testimony relating to an ultimate
issue. The testimony must be evaluated using Rules
Expert testimony at the ICTR is “intended to enlighten the Judges on specific
issues of a technical nature, requiring special knowledge in a specific field.”90 This
intimates that the expert’s testimony should be restricted to his field of expertise, but
gives no further guidance regarding opinion testimony.

F.

Rules of Discovery Governing Expert Testimony

1. In the United States

Four categories of experts and the discovery applicable to each were discussed in
the 1980 case of Ager v. Jane C. Strormont Hosp.91 Four separate categories of experts
were reviewed:
1) Experts to be used at trial: The identity and substance of testimony of expert
witnesses may be obtained through the discovery process.
2) Consulting experts who may assist at trial: Discovery of the expert’s opinion
and the information upon which that opinion is based is limited by Fed.R.Evid.
26(b)(4)(B).92

90

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3.]

91

Ager v. Jane C. Strormont Hosp., 622 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1980). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 7.]
92

Fed.R.Evid. 26(b)(4)(B). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1.]
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3) Informally consulted experts: A consulting expert’s opinions, and even her
identity, are generally exempt from the scope of discovery.93
4) Experts whose information was not acquired in preparation for trial (e.g. actors
or viewers of occurrences): Not included within Fed.R.Evid. 26(b)(4)(B) and all
facts or opinions they have are freely discoverable.
As a part of initial disclosures in federal court, a party must provide to all other
parties a wide range of information about a testifying expert’s qualifications and opinion,
including all information that the witness considered in forming the opinion. These
initial disclosures may include a brief narrative of the expert’s qualifications, the general
substance of her testimony, a statement of agreement to testify at trial, a statement that
she will be sufficiently familiar with the action to submit a meaningful deposition, a list
of other recent cases the expert has been a witness in, and a statement of the expert’s
fees.94
The Supreme Court recently held in Weisgram v. Marley Co., that the appellate
courts have the power (under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)) to direct a District (trial) court to enter
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (judgment as a matter of law) if the court
determines that admitted expert testimony was unreliable and inadmissible under Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc.95 The court in Weisgram recognized the ability to

93

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 37.]
and Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(B). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1.]
94

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 37.]
and Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 (a)(2)(B) [Reproduced supra at note 97.]
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remand for new trial, but held that this was not a requirement. This demonstrates the
court’s position that expert testimony can be highly persuasive, and that it must therefore
be deemed reliable before it is admitted into evidence and heard by the jury.96
In pre-trial stages, experts often testify through signed affidavits. Even at this
early stage, the opinions of the expert, the expert’s qualifications, and the methods used
to form the opinions are subject to the laws governing discovery.97

2. At the ICTR

Discovery of witnesses and information in proceedings before the Tribunal is
mandated by the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.98 Rule 66 provides that a list of

95

Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440 (2000). [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 20.], citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8.]

96

It is of note, however, that the appellate court’s standard of review is limited to “abuse
of discretion,” as decided in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]

97

Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 (a)(2),Disclosure of Expert Testimony, states, “(A) In addition to the
disclosures required by paragraph (1), a party shall disclose to other parties the identity of
any person who may be used at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence.
(B) Except as otherwise stipulated or directed by the court, this disclosure shall, with
respect to a witness who is retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in
the case or whose duties as an employee of the party regularly involve giving expert
testimony, be accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness. The
report shall contain a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and
reasons therefor; the data or other information considered by the witness in forming the
opinions; any exhibits to be used as a summary of or support for the opinions; the
qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications authored by the witness
within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony;
and a listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or
by deposition within the preceding four years…” (italics mine)
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witnesses who a party intends to call must be provided to opposing counsel no later than
60 days before trial. According to Rule 73, a motion must be made to the Judge if a party
intends to deviate from this list once trial had begun.99 Expert witnesses specifically are
governed by Rule 94, which mandates that the full statement of any expert to be called
must be disclosed no less than 21 days prior to the date on which the expert is expected to
testify.100 The opposing party must file a notice (within 14 days) indicating whether they
accept the expert witness’ statement as well as whether they wish to cross-examine the
witness.101
In addition to the list of witnesses a party intends to call, Rules 66 and 68 require
the disclosure of materials (documents) and any exculpatory evidence, respectively.102
98

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, entered
into force June 29, 1995. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 4.]
99

The Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema (Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T) Decision on the
Request of the Defence Pursuant to Rule 73 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for
Summons on Witnesses. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13.] See
also The Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana (Case No. ICTR-99-52-I) Decision on the
Prosecutor’s Application to Add Witness X to its List of Witnesses and for Protective
Measures (discussing definitions of “good cause” and “interests of justice.”)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 17.]

100

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
entered into force June 29, 1995. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 4.]

101

Rule 94, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, entered into force June 29, 1995. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 4.] See also, The Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana (Case No. ICTR-99-52-I)
Decision on the Prosecutor’s Oral Motion for Leave to Amend the List of Selected
Witnesses [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 16.] and The Prosecutor v.
Ferdinand Nahimana (Case No. ICTR-99-52-I) Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application
to Add Witness X to its List of Witnesses and for Protective Measures. [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 17.]
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International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
entered into force June 29, 1995. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 4.]
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Rule 66 may be held to include reports (findings) of expert witnesses intended to be
called at trial.

G. Previous Uses of Expert Witnesses

1. In Criminal Trials in the United States

Forensics is “the application of the tools of science, as well as specific
scientific facts, to help solve legal problems.”103 The term “forensics” encompasses
many things. Forensics can be broken down into Forensic Sciences, Forensic Medicine,
and Forensic Psychiatry/Psychology. Listed below are some examples of ways in which
experts are used in the different fields of forensics:
a. Forensic Sciences
♦ Accident Reconstruction:
1) Ballistics (bullet entry/exit)
2) Bloodstain Pattern Analysis
3) Computer re-enactments
♦ Chemistry (trace evidence collection)
♦ Communication and Media:
1) Image processing (photographs and video)
2) Linguistics audio/ audio tapes
♦ Fingerprints
♦ Fires and Explosions
♦ Hair Fibers palynology
For a discussion of the Rules governing discovery, see The Prosecutor v. Ferdinand
Nahimana (Case No. ICTR-99-52-I) Decision on the Prosecutor’s Oral Motion for Leave
to Amend the List of Selected Witnesses. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 16.]
103

Vocabulary section of: http://school.discovery.com/lessonplans/programs/forensics/
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 49.]
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♦ Toolmarks/shoeprints
♦ Toxicology (drug testing, etc.)
♦ Weapons Experts:
1) Firearms Identification (Ballistics)
2) Materials Testing
b. Forensic Medicine
Used for identification of victims and suspects:
♦ Anthropology (craniofacial identification) Discern the age, sex, ancestry, stature,
and unique features of a decedent from the skeleton.104
♦ DNA testing
♦ Odontology
Medical examiners are often used as expert witnesses at trial, testifying to their
determinations as to the cause of death of a victim. This testimony encompasses both the
technical cause of death (e.g. fracture to the skull) and the expert’s opinion as to what
may have caused the injury (e.g. a forceful blow by a blunt instrument).
c. Psychological/Psychiatric
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦

Criminal Profiling
Criminal Responsibility
Criminology (hate crimes experts)
Diminished Capacity
Fitness for Trial (e.g. competency)
Risk Assessment (evaluation of possible recidivism)
Sanity determinations (mental state at the time of the offense)
Sexual Deviance
Victim affects
1) Art Interpretation (to show effects of crime in children who may be too young
to express their emotions).
2) Trauma determinations105

104

American Board of Forensic Anthropology http://www.csuchico.edu/anth/ABFA/
(visited on 10/27/01) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 48.]

105

ExpertLaw.com- Criminal Litigation Expert Witness Directory
http://www.expertlaw.com/experts/criminal.html (visited 10/12/01). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 41.]
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2. At the ICTR

a. Cultural/ Political/ Historical

Historians who specialize in the study of Rwanda are often called by the
Prosecution to discuss the cultural and political climate which led up to the genocide of
1994.106 For example, in the Rutaganda case,107 a Professor was proffered by the
Prosecution to testify that the interhamwe spearheaded the genocide.

b. Linguistic

Linguistic experts at the ICTR may be used to make determinations about malice,
bias, or innuendos in speech.108 This can be of the utmost import when prosecuting those
who use radio and television to communicate information to and to rally those actually
committing genocide and crimes against humanity. These individuals are likewise
culpable for the crimes they instigate, yet they can be some of the most difficult to
prosecute. Socio-linguistic experts use statistical analysis as well as sociological analyses

106

One example of this is found in The Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu (Case No.
ICTR-96-4-T) Decision on a Defence Motion for the Appearance of an Accused as an
Expert Witness. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 12.]

107

The Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda (Case No. ICTR-96-3T) Decision on the Defence Motion for Disclosure of Evidence. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 19.]

108

In the United States, linguistics experts are utilized in the same fashion in libel and
slander suits.
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of linguistics to make determinations regarding the origin and cultural influence of
speech or writing. For example, in The Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana,109 a witness
was called to testify regarding Radio Rwanda, false communications, and Nahimana’s
attitude toward Tutsis.

c. Forensic

Forensic experts may be utilized before the Tribunal in much the same way they
are used in the United States: to prove the commission of specific acts by the accused.
For example, In The Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, et al., two expert
witnesses were called by the Prosecution to testify regarding electronic and print media,
in addition to the historical and socio-linguistic experts.110 These experts can be utilized
to prove that the accused is guilty of the crimes alleged in the indictment.
In the Rutaganda case, 111 the director of medical examiners (Dr. Haglund) was
called by the prosecution to testify regarding his findings. His team exhumed the bodies

109

The Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana (Case No. ICTR-99-52-I) Decision on the
Prosecutor’s Application to Add Witness X to its List of Witnesses and for Protective
Measures. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 17.]
110

The Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana (Case No. ICTR-99-52-I) Decision on the
Prosecutor’s Oral Motion for Leave to Amend the List of Selected Witnesses.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 16.]
111

The Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda (Case No. ICTR-96-3T) Decision of 6 December 1999.
Reported at Foundation Hirondelle, Agency of Information, documentation and
formation, Arusha (Tanzania): International Penal court for Rwanda, Anderson George
Rutaganda, Witnesses of Defence.
http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=fr&u=http://www.hirondelle.org/hirondell
e.nsf/c0d4ea7a44b64faec12564e500421ff1/0693445a8faae88ec12568300006d6fc%3FOp
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from several sites, including the Amgar garage. The defense responded by calling an
expert anthropologist to refute Dr. Haglund’s testimony by stating that his report was full
of errors. The prosecution called a former Kigali prosecutor to testify to the criminality of
the Interhamwe militia between 1992 and 1994. The Defense called an expert to dispute
the duration of the genocide’s planning stage, though affirming that RTLM was “radio of
war.”
These examples evidence that the ICTR has adopted an adversarial system
regarding expert testimony. Opposing parties each offer the evidence supporting their
case, and the judge acts as gatekeeper, not inquisitor. It is for the Tribunal to filter the
proffered evidence and allow in only what is relevant and reliable, as is the test in so
many countries.
It would be greatly beneficial for the Tribunal to create a rule specifically setting
out the requirements for the admission of expert testimony, the allowable scope of the
testimony, and the methods for challenging an expert.

enDocument&prev=/search%3Fq%3DRutaganda%26hl%3Den (visited 11/28/01).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab .]
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